Syllogisms delivered in an angry voice lead to improved performance and engagement of a different neural system compared to neutral voice by Kathleen W. Smith et al.
ORIGINAL RESEARCH














Department of Psychology, Faculty
of Health, York University, 4700 Keele
Street, Toronto, ON M3J 1P3,
Canada
vgoel@yorku.ca
Received: 06 February 2015
Accepted: 27 April 2015
Published: 12 May 2015
Citation:
Smith KW, Balkwill L-L, Vartanian O
and Goel V (2015) Syllogisms
delivered in an angry voice lead
to improved performance
and engagement of a different neural
system compared to neutral voice.
Front. Hum. Neurosci. 9:273.
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2015.00273
Syllogisms delivered in an angry
voice lead to improved performance
and engagement of a different neural
system compared to neutral voice
Kathleen W. Smith1, Laura-Lee Balkwill2, Oshin Vartanian3 and Vinod Goel1,4*
1 Department of Psychology, Faculty of Health, York University, Toronto, ON, Canada, 2 Humanist Canada, Ottawa, ON,
Canada, 3 Department of Psychology, University of Toronto at Scarborough, Toronto, ON, Canada, 4 IRCCS Fondazione
Ospedale San Camillo, Venice, Italy
Despite the fact that most real-world reasoning occurs in some emotional context,
very little is known about the underlying behavioral and neural implications of such
context. To further understand the role of emotional context in logical reasoning we
scanned 15 participants with fMRI while they engaged in logical reasoning about neutral
syllogisms presented through the auditory channel in a sad, angry, or neutral tone of
voice. Exposure to angry voice led to improved reasoning performance compared to
exposure to sad and neutral voice. A likely explanation for this effect is that exposure to
expressions of anger increases selective attention toward the relevant features of target
stimuli, in this case the reasoning task. Supporting this interpretation, reasoning in the
context of angry voice was accompanied by activation in the superior frontal gyrus—
a region known to be associated with selective attention. Our findings contribute to a
greater understanding of the neural processes that underlie reasoning in an emotional
context by demonstrating that two emotional contexts, despite being of the same
(negative) valence, have different effects on reasoning.
Keywords: reasoning, emotion, fMRI, anger, sadness, auditory
Introduction
It has been demonstrated that whereas reasoning with neutral material was associated with acti-
vation in left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, reasoning with negatively charged (provocative)
emotional material was associated with activation in ventromedial prefrontal cortex; furthermore,
these neural mechanisms were activated in a reciprocal manner (Goel and Dolan, 2003b). Smith
et al. (2014) found that, when emotion was induced by positively or negatively valenced picto-
rial stimuli prior to the introduction of the reasoning task, reasoning about neutral material led
to dissociable neural patterns depending on whether the induction had been positive, negative, or
neutral. For example, direct comparison of neural activation in the reasoning time windows in the
positive and negative conditions, after controlling for baseline eﬀects, yielded activation in cerebel-
lar vermis and right inferior frontal gyrus (orbitalis) after positive emotion induction but activation
in left caudate nucleus and left inferior frontal gyrus (opercularis) after negative emotion induction.
In the current study, we continue our investigation of the eﬀect that emotion has on reason-
ing. Whereas the previous studies examined the eﬀects of visually presented emotional syllogism
content, and visually presented emotional valence (positive and negative), here our interest is to
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discover whether reasoning and its neural underpinnings will be
aﬀected diﬀerently by exposure to the expression of two diﬀerent
emotions in the auditory channel.
There is support from various theoretical models in the
literature for the existence of diﬀerent speciﬁc emotions, each
with its own neural and/or physiological signature (Friedman,
2010); moreover, individuals in therapy can be guided to switch
from one speciﬁc emotion to another by methods designed to
alter their underlying physiology and therefore their current
emotional experience (Smith and Greenberg, 2007). Appraisal
models likewise consider the diﬀerential eﬀects of speciﬁc
emotions such as dispositional fear and anger on the evalua-
tion of subsequently occurring events (Lerner and Keltner, 2001;
DeSteno et al., 2004; Dunn and Schweitzer, 2005).
Our interest in testing the eﬀects of speciﬁc emotions (rather
than emotional valence) is that we hope to show that reasoning
and its neural underpinnings are aﬀected diﬀerently by expres-
sion of diﬀerent speciﬁc emotions. We chose anger and sadness as
the speciﬁc emotions because there is literature (to be presented
next) suggesting that these emotions are characterized diﬀer-
ently.
The neuroimaging literature provides evidence that sadness
and anger are characterized diﬀerently. A meta-analysis of
neuroimaging of emotion (Murphy et al., 2003) reported that
whereas anger has been associated with the lateral orbitofrontal
cortex, happiness and sadness have been associated with
supracallosal anterior cingulate and dorsomedial prefrontal
cortex.
Neural activation associated with hearing the voice of an angry
speaker (Sander et al., 2005) was noted in bilateral superior
temporal sulcus (right BA 42, bilateral BA 22) and right amyg-
dala. Grandjean et al. (2005) demonstrated that superior temporal
lobe activation associated with anger prosody is associated with
the angry emotion itself, and not with low-level acoustical prop-
erties of the stimulus. Other activations found by Sander et al.
(2005) include cuneus, left superior frontal gyrus (BA 8), right
medial orbitofrontal cortex, left lateral frontal pole (BA 10),
right superior temporal sulcus (BA 39), and bilateral ventrolat-
eral prefrontal cortex (BA 47). Ethofer et al. (2009) investigated
whether neural activation to angry versus neutral prosody would
depend on the relevance of the prosody to the task; tasks were
to judge the aﬀective prosody (angry, neutral) or word class
(adjective, noun) of semantically neutral spoken words. Neural
activation associated with angry versus neutral prosody was
reported in bilateral superior temporal gyrus, bilateral inferior
frontal/orbitofrontal cortex, bilateral insula, mediodorsal thala-
mus, and bilateral amygdala, regardless of task, suggesting that
these activations occur automatically when processing emotional
information in the voice. Neural activation was greater during
judgment of emotion than word classiﬁcation in bilateral infe-
rior frontal/orbitofrontal cortex, right dorsomedial prefrontal
cortex, and right posterior middle and superior temporal cortex.
Quadﬂieg et al. (2008) found that neural activation associated
with angry versus neutral prosody was noted in fronto-temporal
regions, amygdala, insula, and striatum. Identiﬁcation of the
prosody as emotional was additionally associated with acti-
vation in orbitofrontal cortex. Individuals with social phobia,
compared to healthy controls, demonstrated a larger response
in orbitofrontal cortex in response to angry prosody, regard-
less of whether the task related to the prosody (identify prosody
as emotional or neutral) or not (identify the gender of the
speaker).
Neural correlates of sadness invoked by re-experiencing of
sad autobiographical episodes (Liotti et al., 2000) were reported
in the subgenual anterior cingulate (BA 24/25), right poste-
rior insula, and left anterior insula. Relative deactivation was
noted in right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (BA 9), bilateral
inferior temporal gyrus (left BA 20, right BA 20/37), right
posterior cingulate/retrosplenial cortex, and bilateral parietal
lobes.
A second reason for choosing anger and sadness is that
these emotions have been posited to have diﬀerent eﬀects on
attention, memory, and categorization (Gable and Harmon-
Jones, 2010b) and therefore may have diﬀerent eﬀects on
reasoning.
In theoretical terms, anger is an important emotion because
despite its negative valence it is an ‘approach-related’ emotion,
and this observation has prompted a reconsideration of theo-
retical models of emotion (Carver and Harmon-Jones, 2009).
Carver and Harmon-Jones (2009) proposed a model incorporat-
ing discrete emotions such as joy, anger, calm, and fear into a
dimensional model combining approach/withdrawal with system
functioning (i.e., events going well or poorly). In this model,
anger is classiﬁed as an approach emotion activated when system
functioning is going poorly.
Following on this, Gable andHarmon-Jones (2010b) proposed
a model outlining the consequences for attention, memory,
and categorization of emotions classiﬁed on the dimensions of
approach/withdrawal in relation to an object or goal, coupled
with the strength of that motivation. Speciﬁcally, disgust and fear
may be strong motivators to avoid an object or goal whereas
sadness may be a mild motivator to withdraw from an object or
goal. Anger, in contrast, may be a strong motivator to approach
an object or goal, despite being negative in valence (Carver and
Harmon-Jones, 2009). Regarding the consequences of a strong
motivator (such as anger) and a weak motivator (such as sadness)
on attention, converging evidence (see Gable and Harmon-Jones,
2010b for a review) suggests that strong motivation to either
approach or avoid an object or goal is associated with narrowed
attention toward that object or goal, and a lack of attention to
other stimuli in the environment that are not relevant to that
goal. In contrast, weak motivation, which may occur post-goal-
attainment, is associated with broadened attention toward more
information from the environment beyond the goal itself.
Consistent with the Gable and Harmon-Jones (2010b) model,
lab-induced anger and fear have (separately) led to selective
attention to targets at the expense of non-target information
(Finucane, 2011); so has disgust (Gable and Harmon-Jones,
2010a). Brosch et al. (2008) reported that angry prosody facili-
tated selective attention to a concurrently presented visual stim-
ulus.
In contrast, sadness has led to a broadening of attention to
global rather than local features of stimuli (Gable and Harmon-
Jones, 2010a).
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As has been noted above, anger is often studied using an
auditory paradigm. Accordingly, we decided to use an auditory
paradigm in the current study. Auditory paradigms have been
used previously to study reasoning in the absence of emotion
(Knauﬀ et al., 2002, 2003; Fangmeier and Knauﬀ, 2009).
Finally, we chose to deliver the reasoning material concur-
rently with the emotive (and neutral) tones of voice, rather
than subsequent to the diﬀerent tones of voice. Our choice was
pragmatic: the latter design would have resulted in a longer
experiment, and therefore longer scanning time.
Therefore, our study investigated whether reasoning about
neutral material would be aﬀected if the content were presented
in sad, neutral, or angry tone of voice. To address this issue, we
constructed a 3 (Emotion) × 2 (Task) within-subjects design,
where the three levels of the Emotion factor were sad, neutral,
and angry, and the two levels of the Task factor were reasoning
and baseline.
In Smith et al. (2014), the negative and positive valence
inductions were each comprised of a mix of emotions, and we
found that reasoning tended to be impaired after each valence of
emotion. In the current study, our choice of two speciﬁc nega-
tive emotive tones of voice, anger and sadness, was motivated by
the expectation that each of these speciﬁc expressions of emotion
would lead to diﬀerent reasoning performance and diﬀerent
underlying neural characteristics. Thus, our hypothesis was that
the neural systems underlying reasoning (involving syllogisms
with neutral content) following exposure to each of angry and
sad emotion expression would diﬀer from the neural underpin-
nings of reasoning in the neutral condition, and would thereby
elucidate the mechanisms underlying diﬀerences in reasoning
performance in the two emotional contexts.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Data were acquired from 17 participants (10 males, 7 females).
Education levels ranged from partially completed undergraduate
study to completed graduate degrees, with a mean of 16 years
(SD = 2.04) of education. Ages ranged from 20 to 38 (mean
26.5 years, SD 5.95).
The study was approved by the York University Research
Human Participants Ethics Committee. All participants gave
informed consent.
Stimuli
Reasoning stimuli consisted of 80 syllogisms that were emotion-
ally neutral in content. The arguments in 39 of these syllogisms
were logically valid whereas the arguments in the remaining 41
were logically invalid. Examples of syllogisms are “All gentle
pets are canines. Some kittens are gentle pets. Some kittens are
canines” (which is valid), and “No fruits are fungi. All mushrooms
are fungi. Some mushrooms are fruits” (which is invalid).
As well, there were 40 baseline “syllogisms,” in which the
concluding sentence was taken from a diﬀerent syllogism in
the dataset, thereby ensuring that the conclusion of the base-
line would be unrelated to the content of the two premises. An
example of a baseline trial is “Some movie-goers are men. All
men are French. No people are priests.” Thus, the baseline trials
provide a control for the reasoning trials, in that the following
processes are held constant across both types of trials: hearing
the speaker deliver sentences with neutral semantics, hearing
the emotion in the tone of voice (constant within each condi-
tion), learning the two premises of each argument, and preparing
to engage in reasoning. Crucially, what is not held constant is
that, in a baseline trial, the participant would disengage from the
reasoning process instead of making any attempt to integrate the
“conclusion” into the premises.
We controlled for the eﬀect of belief-bias (Evans, 2003; Goel
and Dolan, 2003a) by ensuring the reasoning syllogisms were
balanced overall for validity and for congruence between logic
and beliefs. Congruence occurs when the argument logic is valid
and the conclusion is believable or when the argument logic is
invalid and the conclusion is unbelievable. Incongruence occurs
when the argument logic is valid and the conclusion is unbeliev-
able or when the argument logic is invalid and the conclusion is
believable.
Congruent syllogisms, incongruent syllogisms, and baselines
were chosen (during study design) for each level of the Emotion
factor (Sad, Neutral, and Angry). Then the order of the 120 trials
was randomized. Finally, the trials were segregated into three
presentation sets of 40 trials each. The order of presentation of
these three sets was counterbalanced among participants, one set
for each session (“run”) in the scanner.
All stimuli had been pre-recorded by the same female speaker
(Laura-Lee Balkwill). Among the 80 reasoning syllogisms, the
tone of voice was sad for 20, angry for 20, and neutral for 40
stimuli. Among the 40 baseline “syllogisms,” the tone of voice
was sad for 10, angry for 10, and neutral for 20 stimuli. Please
refer to the Supplementary Material for a discussion concern-
ing the frequency of baseline trials. The intended expression of
emotion of all of the stimuli was determined by a separate pilot
test involving 15 participants who did not participate in the main
experiment. See Appendix A for details.
Study Design
Each trial involved the following presentation sequence (see
Figure 1): On each trial, the participant listened to a syllogism
through earphones; the task was to press one of two keys to indi-
cate whether or not the conclusion followed logically from the
two previous statements. Each participant used one hand for both
responses; choice of hand was counterbalanced among partici-
pants. Soundﬁles varied in length from 7.4 to 15.6 s (mean 10.74 s,
SD 1.77 s). However, presentation of the next sound stimulus
was not entrained to the preceding response but was timed to be
in synchrony with the acquisition of the brain scans. Therefore,
trials varied in length from 16.53 to 16.74 s (mean 16.65 s, SD
0.024 s).
fMRI Scanning Technique
A 1.5T Siemens VISION system (Siemens, Erlangen,
Germany) was used to acquire T1 anatomical volume images
(1 mm × 1 mm × 1.5 mm voxels) and T2∗-weighted images
(64 × 64, 3 × 3-mm pixels, TE = 40 ms), obtained with a
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FIGURE 1 | Design of each trial.
gradient echo-planar sequence using blood oxygenation level-
dependent (BOLD) contrast. Echo-planar images (2-mm thick)
were acquired axially every 3 mm, positioned to cover the whole
brain. Each volume (scanning of the entire brain) was partitioned
into 36 slices, obtained at 90 ms per slice. Data were recorded
during a single acquisition period. Volume (vol) images, 215
volumes per session, were acquired continuously, for a total of
645 volume images over three sessions, with a repetition time
(TR) of 3.24 s/vol. The ﬁrst six volumes in each session were




Behavioral data were analyzed using SPSS, version 16.0 (SPSS
Inc., Chicago, IL, USA).
Note that we shall refer to the conditions as ‘anger,’ ‘sad,’ and
‘neutral,’ for ease of reading, rather than repeating ‘expression of.’
Data from 15 of the original 17 participants were usable
in the neuroimaging analysis (data from two participants were
discarded because of head movement greater than 2 mm during
scanning); therefore, the behavioral analyses are based on 15
participants. As well, one person’s data for the third run (session)
were discarded because of lack of engagement in the task. There
were a total of 1760 trials remaining: 1175 reasoning (66.76%)
and 585 baselines (33.24%). Fifty percentage of trials were neutral;
25% were sad, and 25% were angry. Thus, half of all trials were
neutral and half were emotional.
Neuroimaging
The functional imaging data were preprocessed and subsequently
analyzed using Statistical Parametric Mapping SPM8 (Friston
et al., 1994; Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience1).
All functional volumes were spatially realigned to the ﬁrst
volume. All volumes were temporally realigned to the AC–PC
slice, to account for diﬀerent sampling times of diﬀerent slices.
1http://www.ﬁl.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm
A mean image created from the realigned volumes was coregis-
tered with the structural T1 volume and the structural volumes
spatially normalized to the Montreal Neurological Institute brain
template (Evans et al., 1993) using non-linear basis functions
(Ashburner and Friston, 1999). The derived spatial transfor-
mation was then applied to the realigned T2∗ volumes, which
were ﬁnally spatially smoothed with a 12 mm FWHM isotropic
Gaussian kernel in order to make comparisons across subjects
and to permit application of random ﬁeld theory for corrected
statistical inference (Worsley and Friston, 1995). The resulting
time series across each voxel were high-pass ﬁltered with a cut-
oﬀ of 128 s, using cosine functions to remove section-speciﬁc low
frequency drifts in the BOLD signal. Global means were normal-
ized by proportional scaling to a grand mean of 100, and the
time series temporally smoothed with a canonical hemodynamic
response function to swamp small temporal autocorrelations with
a known ﬁlter.
During each trial, the participant listened to the aural deliv-
ery of premise one, premise two, and the conclusion of the
syllogism. This was followed by a period of silence during
which the participant could indicate, by a keypress, whether or
not the conclusion logically followed from the ﬁrst two state-
ments. During neuroimaging data analysis, the emotion expres-
sion time window was deﬁned as “listening to premise one
and premise two, plus the gap following premise two.” The
reasoning time window was deﬁned as “the gap from oﬀset
of the conclusion up to but not including the actual motor
response.” Each of these time windows was analyzed sepa-
rately.
Within each stimulus soundﬁle, the mean decibel level was
calculated for the time segment corresponding to each brain scan
that had been acquired. During the ﬁrst level of neuroimaging
analysis, described below, the potential confound of mean decibel
level was covaried out.
Condition eﬀects at each voxel were estimated according to
the general linear model and regionally speciﬁc eﬀects compared
using linear contrasts. Each contrast produced a statistical para-
metric map of the t-statistic for each voxel, which was subse-
quently transformed to a unit normal Z-distribution. The BOLD
signal was modeled as a canonical hemodynamic response func-
tion with time derivative.
Emotion Expression TimeWindow
All events from the emotion expression time window (sad, angry,
and neutral listening) were modeled in the design matrix as
epochs, and events of no interest (conclusion, thinking, and
motor response) were modeled out. Sad, angry, and neutral
listening were each modeled as an epoch from onset of premise
one, with duration being the length of the syllogism minus the
length of the conclusion. Onset for the conclusion condition was
the start of hearing the conclusion; onset for the thinking condi-
tion was the end of hearing the conclusion; and onset for the
motor response was the scan being acquired at the onset time
of each motor response for each participant for each trial. Mean
decibel level for each scan was covaried out during this ﬁrst level
analysis.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 4 May 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 273
Smith et al. Auditory anger improves reasoning: fMRI
Contrast images were subsequently analyzed at the group
level. A one-way univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA),
within-subjects, was conducted with three conditions of interest
(sad, angry, and neutral) and 15 subject conditions, with correc-
tion for non-sphericity. The analysis generates one F test for the
eﬀects of interest. The F test generated a statistical parametric
map of the F-ratio for each voxel. The subsequent comparisons
each generated a statistical parametric map of the t-statistic for
each voxel, which was subsequently transformed to a unit normal
Z-distribution. The activations reported in Supplementary Table
S1 survived a threshold of p< 0.005 using a random eﬀect model
and an extent of 180 voxels. This choice of threshold and extent
corresponds to a corrected p< 0.05 using the AlphaSim program2
with parameters (FWHMx = 8.35 mm, FWHMy = 6.59 mm,
FWHMz = 7.74 mm, within the avg152T2.nii mask from the
SPM toolbox). The real smoothness in the three directions
was estimated from the residuals by using 3dFWHMx. (This
AlphaSim procedure was also used during the reasoning time-
window, with the following parameters: FWHMx = 8.33 mm,
FWHMy = 6.58 mm, FWHMz= 7.71 mm.)
Reasoning TimeWindow
For ﬁrst-level analysis of the reasoning window, the scans
acquired while the participant was engaged in reasoning were
modeled as epochs by task (reasoning, baseline) and emotion
(sad, angry, neutral) whereas all other conditions (Premise 1,
Premise 2, Conclusion, motor response) were modeled out as
events of no interest.
Onset for the six Emotion × Task conditions was the end
of the conclusion sentence. Duration was from that moment
until the individual participants’ motor response within each
trial. However, for those trials where there was no response, or
the response occurred after the start of the next trial, the dura-
tion was set as “start of the next soundﬁle minus 200 ms.” For
those trials where participants responded during the conclud-
ing sentence (6% of trials), the duration was set as 100/3240
(that is, 0.03 TR); this strategy allowed us to include the contrast
image (rather than having an unbalanced design) while ensur-
ing minimal contribution of the activations to the analysis.
Onset for each premise and the conclusion was the beginning
of the relevant sentence; onset of the motor response was the
millisecond at which that response occurred. Thus, altogether, 10
(conditions) × 3 (sessions) contrast images were generated for
each participant. Mean decibel level for each scan was covaried
out.
Contrast images were subsequently analyzed at the group
level. A one-way univariate ANOVA was conducted, within-
subjects, with six conditions of interest (sad reasoning, sad base-
line, angry reasoning, angry baseline, neutral reasoning, neutral
baseline) and 15 subject conditions, with correction for non-
sphericity. The analysis generates one F test for the eﬀects of
interest.
The F test and the subsequent a priori comparisons each
generated a statistical parametric map of the t-statistic for each
voxel, which was subsequently transformed to a unit normal
2http://afni.nimh.nih.gov/pub/dist/doc/manual/AlphaSim.pdf
Z-distribution. The activations reported in Supplementary Table
S2 survived a threshold of p< 0.005 using a random eﬀect model
and an extent of 180 voxels. (See the above description regarding
the emotion expression time-window for details.)
Results
Behavioral Results
The overall percentage of correct responses on the reasoning
trials was 66.9%. For baselines (where the correct response
would always be “not valid”), the percentage of correct responses
was 99.3%. Mean reaction time, after presentation of the third
sentence, on reasoning trials was 2211ms (SD 1121), and on base-
line trials it was 472 ms (SD 112). This diﬀerence was signiﬁcant:
paired t(14) = −6.366, p = 0.001.
For each participant, the percentage of correct responses was
calculated within each level of the Emotion factor. A repeated-
measures analysis was conducted, using the multivariate
approach; the omnibus test was signiﬁcant: F(2,13) = 4.084,
p = 0.042. The Emotion factor (tone of voice) accounted for
38.6% of the total variance in the percentage of correct responses.
The percentage of correct responses was signiﬁcantly higher in
the Angry condition than in the Neutral condition (p = 0.031,
corrected for multiple comparisons using Bonferroni). See
Figure 2.
Mean percentages of correct responses were as follows: neutral
64.4% (SD 14.9); sad 66.1% (SD 16.5); angry 72.6% (SD 16.7).
A repeated-measures analysis of response time on correct
responses was conducted across the Emotion factor. There was no
signiﬁcant diﬀerence among the means (p = 0.818). Mean reac-
tion times were as follows: neutral 1599ms (SD 480); sad 1626ms
(SD 672); angry 1671 ms (SD 573).
Neuroimaging Results
Emotion Expression Time Window
As indicated in Supplementary Table S1, in the contrast
(Emotion − Neutral), relative deactivation was found in
left hippocampus extending into left insula and relative
activation was found in right posterior insula extending into
FIGURE 2 | The percentage of correct reasoning responses was
significantly higher in the angry condition than in the neutral or sad
conditions.
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right inferior temporal gyrus. The reverse contrast, namely
(Neutral − Emotion), yielded relative deactivation in left infe-
rior frontal gyrus (opercularis, extending into triangularis area
45) and in left precentral gyrus extending into left superior
frontal gyrus. The contrast (Sad − Neutral, masked inclusively
with Emotion − Neutral at p = 0.05) yielded relative activa-
tion in left hippocampus extending into left precuneus, in right
hippocampus extending into right inferior temporal gyrus and
right fusiform, in left inferior temporal gyrus extending into left
hippocampus and fusiform, and in right primary somatosen-
sory cortex extending into right precentral gyrus (area 6; see
Figure 3). The reverse contrast (Neutral – Sad) yielded rela-
tive activation in left superior temporal gyrus extending into
middle temporal gyrus, in right superior temporal gyrus, relative
deactivation in left cerebellum extending into right cerebellar
vermis, in left inferior frontal gyrus (opercularis: area 44), in left
calcarine gyrus (area 17), and in right cerebellum. The contrast
(Angry − Neutral, masked inclusively with Emotion − Neutral
at p = 0.05) yielded relative activation in left superior temporal
gyrus, in right superior temporal gyrus, and in right supra-
marginal gyrus extending into right superior temporal gyrus (see
Figure 4). The reverse contrast (Neutral − Angry) yielded rela-
tive deactivation in left superior frontal gyrus (area 6), in left
supramarginal gyrus, and in right angular gyrus. The contrast
(Sad − Angry, masked inclusively with Emotion − Neutral at
p = 0.05) yielded relative activation in left hippocampus extend-
ing into left cuneus, and in right hippocampus extending into
right inferior temporal gyrus. The reverse contrast (Angry − Sad,
masked inclusively with Emotion − Neutral at p = 0.05) yielded
relative activation in left superior temporal gyrus extending into
secondary somatosensory cortex, and in right superior temporal
gyrus.
FIGURE 3 | The contrast (Sad − Neutral) elicited activation in (A) left hippocampus (MNI co-ordinates: −30, −30, −12, cluster size 6766 voxels,
Z = 5.83), and in (B) right hippocampus (MNI co-ordinates: 40, −8, −24, cluster size 1135 voxels, Z = 4.51). There was also activation in left inferior
temporal gyrus and in right primary somatosensory cortex (not shown).
FIGURE 4 | The contrast (Angry − Neutral) elicited activation in (A) left superior temporal gyrus (MNI co-ordinates: −46, −14, 4, cluster size
746 voxels, Z = 5.01), and in (B) right superior temporal gyrus (MNI co-ordinates: 50, −10, −4, cluster size 463 voxels, Z = 6.20). There was also
activation in right supramarginal gyrus (not shown).
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Reasoning Time Window
As indicated in Supplementary Table S2, analysis of the main
eﬀect of (Reasoning − Baseline) yielded relative activation
in right insula extending into right caudate nucleus, in left
precentral gyrus extending into left primary somatosensory
cortex, and in left insula extending into left inferior frontal
gyrus (triangularis). Analysis of the main eﬀect (Emotional
Reasoning − Emotional Baseline) yielded relative activation
in right thalamus (temporal) extending into right insula, in
left precentral gyrus extending into left primary somatosensory
cortex, and in right middle cingulate cortex.
For results of simple eﬀect analyses please refer to the
Supplementary Material including Supplementary Table S2.
We next addressed the question of whether neural acti-
vation underlying reasoning in an emotional context,
collapsed across the emotion factor, would diﬀer from
that underlying neutral reasoning. The interaction contrast
[(Emotional Reasoning − Emotional Baseline) − (Neutral
Reasoning − Neutral Baseline)] yielded relative activation in left
thalamus (temporal) extending into right thalamus (temporal)
and right caudate nucleus, and in right middle cingulate cortex
(see Figure 5). For details of the reverse interaction contrast,
see the Supplementary Material including Supplementary
Table S2.
To determine whether neural activation underlying reasoning
in the sad and neutral time windows would diﬀer, we analyzed the
interaction contrast [(Sad Reasoning − Sad Baseline) − (Neutral
Reasoning − Neutral Baseline)]; this analysis yielded no clus-
ters surviving the speciﬁed extent. For details of the reverse
interaction contrast, see the Supplementary Material including
Supplementary Table S2.
To determine whether neural activation underlying reason-
ing in the angry and neutral time windows would diﬀer, we
analyzed the interaction contrast [(Angry Reasoning − Angry
Baseline) − (Neutral Reasoning − Neutral Baseline)]; this
analysis yielded relative activation in right superior frontal gyrus
and in right thalamus (prefrontal; see Figure 6). For details of
the reverse interaction contrast, see the Supplementary Material
including Supplementary Table S2.
To determine whether neural activation underlying reasoning
in the sad and angry time windows would diﬀer, we analyzed the
interaction contrast [(Sad Reasoning − Sad Baseline) − (Angry
Reasoning − Angry Baseline)] and also the reverse interac-
tion contrast [(Angry Reasoning − Angry Baseline) − (Sad
Reasoning− Sad Baseline)]; neither of these interaction contrasts
yielded any clusters surviving the speciﬁed extent.
To determine whether there would be any activations in
common between sad reasoning and angry reasoning after
accounting for their respective baselines, we conducted a
conjunction analysis of the two interaction contrasts [(Sad
Reasoning − Sad Baseline) − (Neutral Reasoning − Neutral
Baseline)] and [(Angry Reasoning − Angry Baseline) − (Neutral
Reasoning − Neutral Baseline)]; however, there were no
suprathreshold clusters.
Discussion
Engagement with the Task
First, we consider whether participants were engaged in the
reasoning task, by looking ﬁrst at the behavioral and then at the
neural results. Behaviorally, we note that accuracy levels were
above chance. At the neural level, we have reported caudate
nucleus involvement in several reasoning contrasts, including
the main eﬀect of reasoning. Such ﬁndings are consistent with
the important role of basal ganglia in the reasoning process, as
reported in the literature (Goel et al., 2000; Christoﬀ et al., 2001;
Melrose et al., 2007; Smith et al., 2014).
Success of Tone of Voice Manipulations
Second, we consider whether our tone of voice manipulations
were successful. Reasoning performance in the sad condition
FIGURE 5 | The interaction contrast [(Emotional Reasoning − Emotional Baseline) − (Neutral Reasoning − Neutral Baseline)] elicited activation in (A)
left thalamus (MNI co-ordinates: −8, −2, 6, cluster size 832 voxels, Z = 3.88), and in (B) right middle cingulate cortex (MNI co-ordinates: 12, 6, 38,
cluster size 311 voxels, Z = 3.47).
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FIGURE 6 | The interaction contrast [(Angry Reasoning − Angry Baseline) − (Neutral Reasoning − Neutral Baseline)] elicited activation in (A) right
superior frontal gyrus (MNI co-ordinates: 26, 22, 46, cluster size 611 voxels, Z = 3.43), and in (B) right thalamus (MNI co-ordinates: 12, −4, 8, cluster
size 220 voxels, Z = 3.67).
was neither impaired nor improved compared to reasoning in
the neutral condition. However, reasoning performance in the
angry condition was better than in the neutral tone of voice
condition. If we were to consider only the behavioral results,
we might conclude that the sad tone of voice was ineﬀective.
However, the pattern of neural results indicates that each of the
two tones of voice were successful: During the listening time
window, each emotive tone of voice condition yielded a diﬀer-
ent pattern of neural activation. Speciﬁcally, the contrast “sad
minus neutral” activated a diﬀerent neural pattern than did the
contrast “angerminus neutral.” As well, the contrasts “sadminus
angry” and “angryminus sad” yielded diﬀerent patterns of neural
activation. Thus, evidence shows that while participants were
listening to the syllogism, they were being aﬀected, concurrently,
by the emotion expression, whether in the sad or in the angry
condition.
The ﬁeld of emotion research still has much to learn about
the decoding and interpretation of auditory anger; thus, we
should consider the possibility that our ‘anger’ stimuli invoked
responses in the participants that would be more associated with
fearful expression than expression of anger. We did not obtain
emotion ratings during scanning, nor did we acquire peripheral
psychophysical measurements from study participants. However,
converging evidence from the pilot study of stimuli ratings and
from other sources points more toward ‘anger’ than toward
‘fear.’
During the pilot study, participants had the opportunity on
50% of trials to reject both ‘sad’ and ‘angry’ as ratings in favor of
writing down a preferred term; nevertheless no participant wrote
‘fear’ for any stimulus. On the other 50% of trials, participants
were asked to rate stimuli in terms of being active (goal-oriented)
or passive (no goal) rather than choosing an emotion term. Only
one participant rated one ‘angry’ stimulus as passive. On 100% of
trials, participants indicated how sure they were of each rating; for
each of sad and angry, people indicated ‘yes’ or ‘deﬁnitely’ (rather
than ‘maybe’) on 29 out of 30 stimuli being rated. Please refer to
Appendix A for details. Secondly (see below), neural activation
associated with anger expression in the current study was simi-
lar to that reported by Grandjean et al. (2005). We did not ﬁnd
any neural activation in amygdala, a neural region often asso-
ciated with fear (LeDoux, 1996; van Well et al., 2012; Adolphs,
2013).
Interpretation of Findings Regarding
Reasoning in an Angry Context
We now consider how the ﬁndings regarding reasoning in an
angry context should be interpreted. In two separate studies,
induced anger has been shown to enhance heuristic rather than
analytical processing (Bodenhausen et al., 1994; Tiedens and
Linton, 2001). In contrast, Gable and Harmon-Jones (2010b)
proposed that emotions such as anger that are associated
with high motivation toward a goal should promote selective
attention toward a target and away from irrelevant distrac-
tion. Indeed, that model ﬁts well with our behavioral ﬁnd-
ings, which were that reasoning (the target task) improved
after angry tone of voice (which was not the focus of the
assigned task) compared to reasoning after neutral tone of
voice.
As reported above, neural activation associated with hearing
the voice of an angry speaker (Sander et al., 2005) was noted in
bilateral superior temporal sulcus (right BA 42, bilateral BA 22),
and right amygdala; Grandjean et al. (2005) demonstrated that
superior temporal lobe activation associated with anger prosody
is associated with the angry emotion itself, and not with low-level
acoustical properties of the stimulus. Sander et al. (2005) utilized
a dichotic listening task, which was to attend to the left- or right-
ear presentation and identify the gender of the speaker; there
was no instruction associated with the speaker’s angry or neutral
tone of voice. The above ﬁndings (in Sander et al., 2005) were for
angry prosody regardless of whether attended or not; however,
neural data were also analyzed separately for the attended and
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unattended ear of presentation. There was a tendency (in Sander
et al., 2005) for activation in orbito-frontal cortex to increase
in the attended-side angry prosody condition and to decrease
in the unattended-side neutral prosody condition. Also, there
was a tendency for activation in bilateral ventro-lateral prefrontal
cortex to increase in the attended-side angry prosody condition.
There was also activation in right cuneus associated with attended
anger, but this activation did not survive correction for multi-
ple comparisons. In the current study, we noted activation in left
cuneus associated with the angry reasoning condition, but we did
not ﬁnd any activations in orbito-frontal cortex, ventro-lateral
prefrontal cortex, right cuneus, or amygdala, in either the angry
listening time window or the angry reasoning timewindow. Thus,
neural activations previously associated with attention to the
anger prosody were not apparent among our ﬁndings.
Selective attention has often been associated with neural acti-
vation in right superior frontal gyrus (see the review by Corbetta
and Shulman, 2002). In the current study, reasoning in the angry
condition was found to be associated with signiﬁcant activation
in right superior frontal gyrus and in right thalamus.
Thus, converging behavioral and imaging evidence suggests
that, during the listening time window, angry tone of voice
led to activation of neural regions previously associated with
unattended anger; subsequently, during the (silent) reasoning
time window, a neural region previously associated with selec-
tive attention toward the main task (in this case, reasoning) was
recruited and participants’ level of reasoning performance was
sharper than it was after neutral tone of voice.
Interpretation of Findings Regarding
Reasoning in a Sad Context
Clearly, a diﬀerent mechanism was at work as a result of the
expression of sad tone of voice. As we indicated above, the
expressed sadness itself was eﬀective, leading to a diﬀerentiated
pattern of neural activation during the listening time window.
Looking at past literature, we note that auditory induction of
sadness, using sad classical music, led to activation in hippocam-
pus/amygdala and auditory association areas (Mitterschiﬀthaler
et al., 2007); as in that study, our use of sad expression led to
extensive activation in hippocampus during the listening time
window. However, in Mitterschiﬀthaler et al. (2007) partici-
pants were directed to pay attention to their emotional experi-
ence during scanning. A diﬀerent study showed that emotional
memories, but not neutral memories, have been associated with
hippocampal and amygdala activation (Dolcos et al., 2004).
Therefore, we propose that in the current study, participants were
attending to the sad tone of voice while simultaneously learning
the syllogism. However, given that reasoning performance in the
sad condition was comparable to that in the neutral condition,
we conclude that sad emotive tone of voice did not signiﬁcantly
impact the reasoning process itself.
Conclusion
We have contributed to a deeper understanding of the character-
ization of speciﬁc emotions, by demonstrating that two contexts
of expressed emotion, each being of negative valence, have never-
theless diﬀerent eﬀects on reasoning. Unlike sad auditory context,
logical reasoning in an angry auditory context is characterized
by increased accuracy, and is accompanied by recruitment of an
underlying neural system known to be associated with selective
attention. These results increase our understanding of the neural
processes that underlie reasoning in the context of auditory
emotion.
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